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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002331

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019

TAGS: [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [IR](#) [JA](#)

SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON OUTCOME OF P5 PLUS 1 GENEVA TALKS WITH
IRAN

REF: STATE 103219

Classified By: CDA James P. Zumwalt per reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 5.

[1](#)2. (C) Drawing on background provided in reftel, Embassy Poloff on October 7 briefed MOFA Second Middle East Division Principal Deputy Director Yukiya Hamamoto and Iran Desk Chief Junichi Sumi on the outcome of the October 1 P5 plus 1 meeting in Geneva with Iran.

[1](#)3. (C) Hamamoto expressed appreciation for the briefing and noted that while Iran's initial response seemed "very encouraging," it remained too early to predict the outcome of the process begun in Geneva. In that context, he noted that the October 7 like-minded meeting would begin in a few hours in Washington and the discussion of further sanctions remained on-going. Citing the absence of China and Russia from the Washington meeting of the like-minded, Hamamoto stressed the importance of coordinating closely with China and Russia in general, and on sanctions in particular. Further sanctions would be difficult to implement without Chinese and Russian cooperation, he said.

[1](#)4. (C) Although generally encouraged by the outcome of the Geneva meeting, Hamamoto observed that there apparently had been little Iranian movement on the P5 plus 1 "Freeze for Freeze" proposal. Iran's apparent unwillingness to freeze its enrichment activities remained very worrisome, he said.

[1](#)5. (C) Referring to the IAEA's Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) proposal under which Iran would provide a portion of its 3.5 percent U-235 low enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for further enrichment and subsequent Russian transfer to France for fabrication into fuel assemblies, Sumi said that some GOJ experts had questioned the assertion that the French-manufactured fuel assemblies would pose no further proliferation risk. Sumi asked whether the U.S. could provide additional information that would refute this contention.
ACTION REQUEST: Please provide further information on TRR proposal, particularly the reduced proliferation risks posed by the French-manufactured fuel assemblies.
ZUMWALT